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Replication is often viewed as the demarcation between science and non-science. However, 
contrary to the commonly held view, we show that in the current (selective) publication system 
replications may increase bias in effect size estimates. Specifically, we examine the effect of 
replication on bias in estimated population effect size as a function of publication bias and the 
studies’ sample size or power. We analytically show that incorporating the results of published 
replication studies will in general not lead to less bias in the estimated population effect size. We 
therefore conclude that mere replication will not solve the problem of overestimation of effect 
sizes. We will discuss the implications of our findings for interpreting results of published and 
unpublished studies, and for conducting and interpreting results of meta-analyses. We also 
discuss solutions for the problem of overestimation of effect sizes, such as discarding and not 
publishing small studies with low power, and implementing practices that completely eliminate 
publication bias (e.g., study registration). 
 Keywords: replication, effect size, publication bias, power, meta-analysis  
Imagine that you want to estimate the effect size of a certain treatment. To this end, you search 
for articles published in scientific journals and you come across two articles that include an 
estimation of the treatment effect. The two studies can be considered exact replications because 
the population, designs and procedures of the included studies are identical. The only difference 
between the two studies concerns their sample size: one study is based on 40 observations (a 
small study; S), whereas the other study is based on 70 observations (a larger study; L). The 
following questions are now relevant: How do you evaluate this information? Which effects would 
you include to get the most accurate estimate of the population effect? Would you evaluate only 
the small study, only the large study, or both? And what if you would have come across two small 
or two large studies? 
To get an idea about the intuitions researchers have about these questions, we 
administered a short questionnaire (see Appendix 1) among three groups of subjects, with 
supposedly different levels of statistical knowledge: second year’s psychology students (N=106; 
paper survey administered during statistics tutorials; Dutch translation), social scientists (N=360; 
online survey), and quantitative psychologists (N=31; paper survey administered at the 78th 
Annual Meeting of the Psychometric Society). In the questionnaire we presented different 
hypothetical situations with combinations of small and large studies, all published in peer-
reviewed journals, and asked which situation would yield the most accurate estimate of the effect 
of the treatment in the population. Accuracy was described in the questionnaire as “the closeness 
of the estimate to the population effect, inversely related to the bias of an estimate”. We list the 
different situations and responses in Table 1.1 
Table 1. 
Results of the questionnaire to assess researchers’ intuitions about the value of replication. Answers of 106 psychology students (PS), 360 social 
scientists (SS), and 31 quantitative psychologists (QP). S = Small published study with 40 observations; L = Large published study with 70 
observations.  
 “Which situation (A or B) 
yields the most accurate 
estimate of the effect of the 




Proportion of subsample that endorses the answer category 
 Situation A Situation B Situation 
A more accurate 
Situation  
B more accurate 
Situation A and B equally 
accurate 
   PS SS QP PS SS QP PS SS QP 
Question 1 L* S .972 .857 .871 .019 .036 .032 .009 .108 .097 
Question 2 L* L+S .057 .045 .032 .925 .839 .935 .019 .117 .032 
Question 3 L* S+S .340 .283 .258 .566 .619 .710 .094 .099 .032 
Question 4 L L+L .000 .022 .032 .943 .915 .935 .057 .063 .032 
Question 5 L+S* S+S .943 .816 .839 .038 .045 .032 .019 .139 .129 
The options that were selected most per subsample are printed in bold face. The correct answers (i.e., the scenarios that were shown to be most effective by 
our calculations) are indicated with a *. There is no * in Question 4, since both situations contain an equal amount of expected bias. 
The three groups showed the same pattern in all five situations: participants preferred to 
use as much information as possible, i.e., they preferred the situation with the largest total sample 
size. For instance, the majority (57% of the students, 62% of the social scientists, 71% of the 
quantitative psychologists) preferred two small studies (total of 80 observations) over one large 
study (70 observations; Question 3). Second, most respondents believed that incorporating a 
small exact replication with a larger study in the evaluation (Question 2) would improve the 
accuracy of the estimate of the effect (93% of the students, 84% of the social scientists, 94% of 
the quantitative psychologists). So answers to questions 2 and 3 revealed two intuitions that are 
widely held among experts, social scientists, and students alike, namely, that (1) the larger the 
total sample size, the higher the accuracy, and (2) any replication, however small, improves 
accuracy. However logical these intuitions may appear at first sight, in this paper we show that 
both intuitions are false in the current publication system.  
In this article we first explain the origin of these intuitions. Secondly, we show that 
replications are not science’s Holy Grail, because of the ‘replication paradox’; the publication of 
replications by itself does not decrease bias in effect size estimates. We show that this bias 
depends on sample size, population effect size, and publication bias. Finally, we discuss the 
implications for replications (and other studies that would be included in a meta-analysis of the 
effect under investigation) and consider possible solutions to problems associated with the use of 
multiple underpowered studies in the current publication system.  
Why Do We Want More Observations and More Studies? 
Our intuitions are grounded in what we learned in our first statistics courses, namely that: 
the larger the sample size, the more information, the greater the precision (i.e., the smaller the 
standard error), and the better the estimate. A replication study can also be viewed as increasing 
the original sample size. Hence, intuitively, both increasing the number of observations and 
incorporating a replication study increases the precision and the accuracy of the estimate of the 
population effect. This line of thought is reflected in the fact that multiple-study papers have 
increasingly become the norm in major psychology journals (Giner-Sorolla, 2012), although many 
of these involve conceptual replications rather than direct replications (Pashler & Harris, 2012; 
see also Makel et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, there is also a large and growing literature on the merits of replication 
studies. For example, replications are said to be able to protect science from fraud and 
questionable research practices (Crocker & Cooper, 2011) and clarify ambiguous results 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Replication is called “the gold standard for reliability” 
and “even if a small number of [independent replications] find the same result, then that result 
can be relied on” (Frank & Saxe, 2012). Finally, replications are supposed to uncover false 
positives that are the result of publication bias (Diekmann, 2011; Murayama, Pekrun, & Fiedler, 
2013).   
However, the above lines of reasoning do not take into account that publication bias may 
influence dissemination of both replication studies and original studies. We show how publication 
bias might limit the usefulness of replication studies and show why publication bias leads our 
intuitions and those of our colleagues (see Table 1) astray. We first present evidence of the 
omnipresence of publication bias in science, and show analytically how publication bias affects 
accuracy of the effect size estimate of a single study. Thereafter, we discuss the implications of 
our findings for the accuracy of effect size estimates in meta-analyses that include replications. 
Publication Bias and How it Affects Effect Size Estimates 
Presence of Publication Bias. Publication bias is the phenomenon that studies with results that 
are not statistically significant are less likely to be published (Greenwald, 1975). A way to search 
for publication bias is by looking for an overrepresentation of statistically significant or “positive” 
findings given the typical power of the studies (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007). If there was no 
publication bias, and all effects were truly non-null (further called “true effects” or “existing 
effects”), then the proportion of positive findings in the literature would be approximately equal to 
the average power (the probability that you reject the null hypothesis when it is false). Although 
the recommended power for a study is at least .80 (e.g., Cohen, 1988), the median power has 
been estimated to average around .35 across studies in psychology (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 
2012)2, the average power is .40-.47 across studies in behavioral ecology (Jennions & Moller, 
2003)3, and .21 across studies in neuroscience (Button et al., 2013)4. However, the rate of 
significant results is 95.1% in psychology and psychiatry, and 85% in neuroscience and behavior 
(Fanelli, 2010). These numbers are incompatible with the average power across studies in the 
respective fields and represent strong evidence for publication bias in these fields. 
An excess of significant findings has been established in many fields (Bakker et al., 2012; 
Button et al., 2013; Fanelli, 2012; Francis, 2014; Ioannidis, 2011; Kavvoura et al., 2008; 
Renkewitz, Fuchs, & Fiedler, 2011; Tsilidis, Papatheodorou, Evangelou, & Ioannidis, 2012). The 
rate of positive findings seems to be higher in the “softer” sciences, such as psychology, than in 
“harder” sciences, such as space sciences (Fanelli, 2010). There is evidence that the rate of 
positive findings has stayed approximately the same from the 1950’s (97.3% in psychology; 
Sterling, 1959) until the 1990s (95.6% in psychology and 85.4% in medical sciences; Sterling, 
Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995), and that it even has increased since the 1990s (Fanelli, 2012).  
Several studies have combined the results of tests of publication bias tests from multiple 
meta-analyses from various scientific fields and found evidence for publication bias in these fields.  
For instance, there is evidence for publication bias in about 10% of the meta-analyses in the field 
of genetic associations (Ioannidis, 2011), in roughly 15% of the meta-analyses in psychotherapy 
(Niemeyer, Musch, & Pietrowsky, 2012, 2013), in 20% to 40% of psychological meta-analyses 
(Ferguson & Brannick, 2012), in about 25%-50% of meta-analyses in the medical sciences 
(Sterne, Gavaghan, & Egger, 2000; Sutton, Duval, Tweedie, Abrams, & Jones, 2000), in 38%-50% 
of meta-analyses in ecology and evolution (Jennions & Moller, 2002), and in about 80% of meta-
analyses in the field of communication sciences (Levine, Asada, & Carpenter, 2009). Although 
percentages of meta-analyses that are subject to publication bias do not seem to be impressively 
high, the power of publication bias tests was generally low in these meta-analyses. Hence, a 
failure to detect evidence for publication bias does not necessarily mean that there is no 
publication bias. A recent study established funnel plot asymmetry as a sign of publication bias in 
82 meta-analyses (Fanelli & Ioannidis, 2013; see also Nuijten, Van Assen, Van Aert, & Wicherts, 
2014).  
Both the high prevalence of positive findings and the tests for publication bias in meta-
analyses are not conclusive (but see Cooper, DeNeve, & Charlton, 1997; Franco, Malhotra, & 
Simonovits, 2014 for direct evidence of bias in psychology and the social sciences), but together 
they make a strong case for a presence of publication bias in much of the scientific literature. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate how studies are affected by publication bias. 
The Effect of Publication Bias on an Estimate from a Single Study. We analytically derived 
the effect of publication bias on the effect size estimate in a published study with a two-
independent samples design (see also Button et al., 2013; Gerber, Green, & Nickerson, 2001; 
Kraemer, Gardner, Brooks, & Yesavage, 1998). We used several scenarios differing in the 
degree of publication bias, the samples sizes, and the underlying effect size. Effect sizes were 
expressed in Cohen’s d, or the standardized mean difference (i.e., d = (μ1 - μ2)/σ), with σ = 1). In 
each scenario we tested H0: d = 0 against H1: d > 0 using a z test. We also derived the effect of 
publication bias in the case where σ is unknown, using a t-test. Because the results of the two 
analyses are very similar, we only report those of the simpler z test. The equations and results for 
the t-test can be found at the Open Science Framework page https://osf.io/rumwi/. 
We assumed that all significant results were published (α = .05) and that there was one 
underlying effect. Two additional parameters were sample size N, and pub, representing the 
proportion of non-significant results published. We assumed that all non-significant p-values had 
the same probability of being published. Our assumptions on the probability of publication can 
also be interpreted differently, i.e., with pub as the probability of publication of a non-significant 
studies relative to the probability of publication of a significant study, where the latter probability 
can be smaller than 1. We were interested in the bias in the effect size estimate as a function of d, 
pub, and N. Figure 1 shows a variant of the typical depiction of power (used in most statistics 
textbooks) in which we display the effect of publication bias. Specifically, it shows the effect of d 
and pub on the published effect size estimate. In the figure “H0” and “H1” are the regions of 
accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis, respectively; 1- represents power, α is the type I 
error, cv is the critical value of the z test, and d is the true population effect size. Without 
publication bias, available studies are drawn from the sampling distribution underlying d (H1). 
However, because of publication bias, non-significant results are less likely published, leading to 
an asymmetry of reported studies. Specifically, the dark gray area represents the proportion of 
studies with non-significant results that get published. The ratio of the lowered density (dark gray) 
to the regular density under H1 in the acceptance region equals pub, which equals .5 in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the effect of publication bias on the published effect size 
estimate. “H0” and “H1” are the regions of accepting and rejecting H0, respectively, 1- 
represents power, α is the type I error, cv is the critical value of the test, and d is the true effect 
size. D0 and D1 are the expected effect sizes conditional on the acceptance or rejection of H0, 
respectively, and D is the expected value of the published effect size. 
 
To establish the bias in the effect size estimate, we calculated the difference between the 
actual effect size d, and the expected value of the published effect size estimate, D. The value of 
D consists of two components. The first component is the expected value of the published effect 
size given that the effect size was significant, D1, i.e., the expected value of the light-gray area. 
The second component is the expected value of the published effect size given that it was non-
significant, D0, or the expected value of the dark-gray area. The overall estimate D is a weighted 
average of D1 and D0, weighted by the light-gray and dark-gray areas, respectively. The higher 
the publication bias, the fewer non-significant findings are published, and the less weight D0 will 
receive. In that case the weighted average will depend more on D1, and D will overestimate d, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. If pub = 1 (no publication bias), the estimate D is equal to the true d, and if 
pub = 0 (maximal publication bias), the estimate D is equal to D1, which overestimates d. 
Appendix 2 contains the exact equations.  
In our analysis of the effect of publication bias on the accuracy of the effect size estimate 
in a published study we varied sample size (N) to be either 20 or 35 observations per group (40 
or 70 observations in total, as in our questionnaire). These sample sizes were chosen to reflect 
typical sample sizes in psychology (Marszalek, Barber, Kohlhart, & Holmes, 2011; Wetzels et al., 
2011). The population effect size, Cohen´s d, varied from zero to one. Finally, we chose values of 
pub equal to 0, .05, .25, .5, and 1. Values for pub of 0 and 1 reflect the two most extreme 
scenarios: total publication bias and no publication bias at all, respectively. The value .05 was 
based on an estimate of publication bias using the number of significant findings in the literature 
(see Appendix 3). We included the values .25 and .5 to reflect less severe publication bias. The 
dependent variable of our analysis is the bias in the effect size estimate, which is equal to the 
expected published effect size minus the true effect. The more bias in the effect size estimate, the 
less accurate the estimate. So in Figure 1, this amounts to the difference between d and D. Note 
that whereas this analysis renders the bias of the effect size estimate, the realized estimate will 
differ across studies and fields. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of publication bias and population effect size on the bias in the 
effect size estimate in a single study with either 35 (left) or 20 observations per group (right). In 
both the large and the small study the same pattern appears. Both scenarios show that if the true 
effect size is sufficiently large, the bias approximates zero; the effect size estimate as it appears 
in the literature is equal to the true effect size. The nihil bias arises because for large enough 
effect sizes nearly all experiments are significant and therefore published. However, if the true 
effect size becomes smaller, more findings are non-significant and are not published. When that 
happens, bias or the overestimation of the effect generally increases.  
 
Figure 2. The effect of publication bias and population effect size (Cohen’s d) on the bias in the 
effect size estimate in a single study with either 35 or 20 observations per group. The bias in the 
effect size estimate is equal to the published effect minus the true effect. The vertical, dotted lines 
indicate Cohen’s d at a power of .25, .50, and .75, respectively. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of the bias depends on the severity of publication bias. If 
there is maximum publication bias (none of the non-significant results are published), the bias is 
the largest (black line in Figure 2). The bias decreases as more non-significant results are 
published. Without publication bias (results are published independent of their statistical 
significance), the bias in the effect size estimates disappears completely (lowest, light gray line in 
Figure 2). Formally, the (relative) bias compared to the situation where only significant results are 
published is a function of both pub and power (see Appendix 4 for the derivation of this equation): 




     (1) 
It follows from (1) that bias already decreases dramatically for small values of pub, which is also 
apparent from the sharp drop in bias for pub=.05. For instance, consider a case in which pub=.05 
and d=0. It follows that the obtained power is equal to α = .05. In this scenario we obtain a 
relative bias of (1-.05)/(1+.05*(.95/.05)) = .95/1.95 = .487, meaning that the bias is more than 
halved compared to the bias when pub=0. This is also apparent from Figure 2: in both the left and 
right panel it shows that at d=0 the bias in effect size estimate more than halves when pub 
increases from 0 to .05. Now consider a scenario where pub = .05 and power is .50 (middle 
vertical dotted line in Figure 2). Here we obtain a relative bias of (1-.05)/(1+.05*(.50/.50)) 
= .95/1.05 = .905, meaning that the bias is only slightly lower compared to the bias when pub = 0. 
It also follows from (1) that relative bias for a certain value of pub is only dependent on power. 
Hence both figures in Figure 2 have exactly the same shape. However, absolute bias decreases 
when sample size increases, hence bias is more severe in the small published study (right figure) 
than in the large published study (left figure). The difference in bias between the two studies is 
greatest when publication bias is maximal, and diminishes as publication bias decreases. 
Surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that bias sometimes first increases when population effect 
size d increases. This happens whenever a small proportion of non-significant studies is 
published (pub=.05, .25, .5) and power is low. This somewhat counterintuitive result is due to two 
opposing forces. The first force is the decrease in bias for pub = 0 (upper black line); as d 
increases, the average D1 of the light gray area in Figure 1 gets closer to d, thereby decreasing 
bias. The other force is relative bias; if pub > 0 and d increases, then power increases and 
relative bias (1) increases. Bias is the product of these two forces (see also Appendix 4). The 
bump in the figures for pub > 0 arises because the increase in relative bias overrules the 
decrease in bias for the significant studies whenever power is small. In other words, bias 
increases because the proportion of significant studies, which result in bias, increases more than 
their bias decreases as d increases. For larger values of power, bias decreases monotonically in 
d because then relative bias increases relatively less (see (1)) than bias for pub = 0 decreases. 
The results of the analysis of the effect of publication bias and true effect size on the 
accuracy on effect size estimate when using a t-test (when σ is unknown) show that the shape of 
the figure based on the results of the t-test is identical to the shape of Figure 2.5 The difference is 
that bias is slightly higher for the t-test than for the z-test, given the same publication bias and 
true effect size, and this difference decreases in sample size or degrees of freedom of the t-test. 
An often-proposed solution to the problems of publication bias is to perform multiple 
studies within an article (see e.g., Murayama et al., 2013), or to add more replications (see e.g., 
Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). However, this advice does not take into account that such multiple 
studies may suffer from the same bias in effect size estimation because of publication bias 
(Francis, 2012a). In the next paragraph we will therefore extend the known implications of 
publication bias on a single published study, to the implications of publication bias on scenarios 
with multiple published studies. 
Implications of Publication Bias on the Accuracy of Multiple Published Studies 
In this paragraph we show that replication studies are not necessarily a solution to the problem of 
overestimated effect size. In fact, we will show that replication can actually add bias to an effect 
size estimate under publication bias. We analytically derived the bias for three possible replication 
scenarios: two large studies, two small studies, and a large and a small study, and compared the 
bias in the effect size estimate with the bias in a single large study. 
Let A be the original study, and B the replication. If we have two studies, the combined 
(weighted) effect size estimate D equals  
𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴+𝑁𝐵𝐷𝐵
𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵
,       (2) 
where NA and NB represent the sample size, and DA and DB the estimated effect size of A and B, 
respectively. The results for the bias of estimated effect size based on both studies are shown in 
Figure 3.  
The left panel of Figure 3 shows the bias after combining two large studies (one large 
study and a large replication). The responses to the questionnaire indicate that most researchers 
believe that two large studies yield a more accurate estimate of effect size than only one large 
study. However, the bias of two large studies is exactly the same as the bias in just one large 
study; because the replication contains the same amount of bias as the original study, the 
weighted average (2) of the two effect sizes will also contain the same amount of bias as the 
original study. Adding a replication to a single study will increase the precision or standard error 
of the estimate, but not its accuracy as long as there is publication bias. 
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of publication bias and population effect size (Cohen’s d) on the bias in the 
effect size estimate in a replication scenario with either two large studies (left panel; identical to 
the bias in just one large study), one large and one small study (middle panel), or two small 
studies (right panel; identical to the bias in just one small study).   
 
The middle panel of Figure 3 shows the bias in a large study combined with a small 
replication. According to the responses to the questionnaire, most researchers believe that a 
combination of one large and one small study yield a more accurate estimate than one large 
study. Again, this intuition is wrong when there is publication bias. Because a small study 
contains more bias than a large study, the weighted average (2) of the effect sizes in a large and 
a small study is more biased than the estimate in a single large study. 
The right panel of Figure 3 shows the bias in a combination of two small studies. The 
responses to the questionnaire indicate that researchers believe a combination of two small 
published studies yields a more accurate estimate than one large published study. This intuition 
is not correct. Our analytical results show that the bias in the total effect size estimate does not 
change if effect size estimates of replication studies of the same size as the original study are 
synthesized with the effect size estimate of the original study. This means that the comparison 
between one large and two small studies is equivalent to a comparison between one large and 
one small study. Hence, the bias is larger in the combination of two small studies than in one 
large study, even though the sample size of the combination is larger than that of the large study.  
In summary, in none of the three replication scenarios did the bias in the effect size 
estimate decrease by synthesizing the published replication with the large original published 
study. This means that both intuitions (1) the larger the total sample size, the higher the accuracy, 
and (2) any replication, however small, improves accuracy, are false when publication bias exists. 
General Implications 
Our examples and questionnaire refer to situations in which a published study is combined with a 
published exact replication. Our analysis shows that synthesizing a published original study with a 
published replication study generally does not decrease bias in the effect size estimate, yet may 
even increase bias if the replication study is smaller (in terms of sample size) than the original 
study. Our analysis has implications for more general situations such as combining effect size 
estimates of (i) an original study and a larger replication study (ii) published conceptual replication 
studies, (iii) conceptual replication studies within one single published article, (iv) many published 
studies on the same phenomenon, as in meta-analysis, and (v) for determining whether an effect 
exists or not. 
In the light of recent calls for high-powered replication studies (see e.g., Brandt et al., 
2014), we encounter more and more situations in which the replication study is actually larger 
than the original study. In those cases, the combined effect size estimate will have less bias than 
the effect size estimate of just the smaller, original study. Note, however, that in these cases 
incorporating the smaller original study in the estimation increases bias. Hence, evaluating only 
the large replication study would provide the most accurate effect size estimate (see also 
Kraemer et al., 1998). 
 The conclusion of our analysis holds for any situation in which two or more published 
effect sizes are combined to obtain an overall effect size (in a meta-analysis), when there is 
publication bias. This principle generally holds for all sample sizes, and any number of studies. 
The smaller the study, the larger the bias. So just like combining one small study with one larger 
study will increase bias in the effect size estimate, combining multiple smaller studies with 
multiple larger studies will also increase bias, as opposed to combining only large studies.  
 The same problem applies to situations in which conceptual (published) replications are 
combined to estimate one underlying (or average) effect size. If both the original study and its 
conceptual replication estimate the same population effect size and are subject to publication 
bias, both effect sizes will be inflated, and combining the two studies to obtain a new effect size 
will result in an overestimation of the population effect size, exactly in the same way as in our 
analysis. Similarly, the overestimation increases as the studies become smaller.  
Multi-study papers are similarly affected by the paradox. Multiple studies within a single 
paper are also susceptible to publication bias (Francis, 2012b, 2012c, 2013; Francis, Tanzman, & 
Matthews, 2014), which means that an overall effect size based on the effects within one multi-
study paper will be inflated as well. Our analysis generalizes straightforwardly to situations in 
which many published effect size estimates are combined, as in meta-analysis, which are also 
affected by publication bias (see e.g.,Fanelli & Ioannidis, 2013; Ferguson & Brannick, 2012; 
Nuijten et al., 2014). Here, too, overestimation gets worse whenever more small or underpowered 
published studies are included. What is even more problematic in meta-analysis is that precision 
of the effect size is increased (i.e., standard error of the estimate is decreased) by including more 
studies, thereby providing a false sense of security in the combined (biased) effect size estimate.  
 Publication bias also affects analyses used to establish whether an effect exists or not. It 
has been argued that replication may uncover false positives (e.g., Diekmann, 2011; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2012; Simmons et al., 2011), but this only holds if studies with non-
significant results are accessible to researchers (see also Ferguson & Heene, 2012). Similarly, it 
has been argued that even though multi-study papers can inflate the effect size estimate, they 
can still decrease the rate of false positives (Murayama et al., 2013). The reasoning is that it is 
implausible that a research team generates, say, five false positive findings, since on average 
5/.05 = 100 studies are needed to obtain five false positives. However, a problem in this 
argument is that the Type I error is typically much larger than .05, because of the use of so-called 
questionable research practices (QRP). For instance, Simmons et al. (2011) show that Type I 
error may even increase to .5 or higher after simultaneous use of some QRPs that are often used 
by researchers (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Simmons et al., 2011). Assuming a Type I 
error of about .5, five positive findings are no longer implausible, since only about ten studies 
need to be run. Both publication bias and QRP affect effect size estimates of smaller studies 
more than larger studies (Bakker et al., 2012; Fanelli & Ioannidis, 2013; Nuijten et al., 2014). This 
means that even if the goal is not to obtain an overall effect size, but to determine whether an 
effect exists, multiple underpowered published studies can still distort conclusions. 
Does the problem of overestimation of population effect size also hold for unpublished 
research? We have to distinguish two different types of unpublished studies. First, there are 
unpublished studies, statistically significant or not, of which the results were subject to biases 
such as QRP. These biases result in overestimation of population effect size, even when a 
study’s outcome was not statistically significant (Bakker et al., 2012). This implies that 
incorporating these unpublished studies into meta-analyses may not decrease bias in effect size, 
particularly if their sample size is similar or smaller to those of published studies. Furthermore, 
this implication begs the question of the validity of publication bias tests that compare the effects 
of published and unpublished studies. These tests suggest there is no publication bias if the 
average effect sizes of published and unpublished studies are similar. Although this publication 
bias test addresses the effect of publication or not, a non-significant difference between the 
effects of published and unpublished studies does not imply that the published studies do not 
yield an overestimated effect size. Ferguson and Brannick (2012, p.126) even concluded that 
unpublished studies should not be included in meta-analyses, because searches for unpublished 
studies may be ineffective and unintentionally biased, and these studies may be inherently flawed. 
The second type of unpublished studies concerns studies that are not affected by biases such as 
QRP. Incorporating these studies into meta-analysis should generally decrease bias. However, 
these studies cannot or can hardly be distinguished from those unpublished studies affected by 
QRP as long as none of these studies are preregistered (see below). Because it is also unknown 
what proportion of unpublished studies is affected by QRP, it is impossible to tell to what extent 
unpublished studies yield overestimated effect sizes, both absolutely and relative to published 
studies.   
Discussion 
At the beginning of this article we presented results from a questionnaire that showed that 
psychology students, social scientists, and experts have the intuition that a published replication, 
independent of its sample size, improves accuracy of an estimated effect size. We also presented 
quotes from the published literature suggesting that replications are considered a tool to uncover 
false positives and to strengthen belief in true positives. We have shown that these intuitions do 
not hold in a publication system with substantial bias against non-significant results. The present 
system seems to be of this type, although some signs of improvement have recently emerged 
(e.g., Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2012). We investigated the effect of 
replication on the bias in effect size estimate as a function of publication bias, sample size, and 
population effect size. We found that synthesizing a published original study with a published 
replication study can even add bias if the replication study’s sample size is smaller than that of 
the original study, but only when there is publication bias. One implication of these findings is that 
replication studies are not necessarily the ultimate solution to false positives in the literature, as is 
sometimes implied, but should be evaluated with caution in the current publication system. Our 
results also hold more generally, i.e., for published conceptual replication studies, conceptual 
replication studies within one single published article, and many published studies on the same 
phenomenon, as in meta-analysis.  
Our findings are based on the assumption that publication bias affects replication studies 
in the same way as it affects original studies. However, it is possible that this is not or no longer 
the case. For instance, publication bias might affect replications even more strongly than it affects 
original studies. Even though more and more psychologists have started to emphasize the 
advantages of replication studies, papers containing only one of more replications may still have 
a low probability of getting published (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; 
Neuliep & Crandall, 1990, 1993). Replications with non-significant results are easily dismissed 
with the argument that the replication might contain a confound that caused the null finding 
(Stroebe & Strack, 2014).  
On the other hand, it is also possible that publication bias affects replications in the 
opposite way in some fields. That is, replications could have a higher chance of getting published 
if they contain non-significant results while a seminal study contains significant results, because 
this would be a controversial and thus an interesting finding. In that case, the next study would be 
controversial again if it were significant. What could follow is an alternation of effect sizes in 
opposite directions that eventually converge to – possibly – the true effect size. This is known as 
the Proteus phenomenon (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2005). If the Proteus phenomenon holds in 
practice, biased effect size estimates will cancel each other out over time and the overall effect 
size estimate will be close to unbiased (De Winter & Happee, 2013). Although the Proteus 
phenomenon may lead to unbiased effect size estimation, neglecting to publish studies with non-
significant results is a very inefficient scientific enterprise with problems for statistical modeling of 
effect sizes (Van Assen, Van Aert, Nuijten, & Wicherts, 2014a, 2014b). Furthermore, even though 
there are occurrences of the Proteus phenomenon in some fields (Ioannidis, 2011), in psychology 
the vast majority of studies test if an effect is significantly different from zero, rather than if an 
effect is significantly different from a previously estimated effect (Fanelli, 2010, 2012; Van Assen, 
Van Aert, et al., 2014a).  
Our analysis also assumes that there are no QRPs that affect the estimated effect size. 
Considering the seemingly widespread prevalence of QRPs (see e.g.,John et al., 2012), this 
might not be a realistic assumption. QRPs will likely also result in overestimation of effect sizes. 
Direct or close replication studies have generally less room for QRPs, since design, procedure, 
and measures are fixed by the original study. Hence less overestimation of effect size because of 
QRPs can be expected in direct replication studies. We must stress, however, that there exist 
only few studies of the effects of QRPs on effect size estimation, alone or in combination with 
publication bias (but see Bakker et al., 2012). Problematic is that QRPs are not well-defined and 
most likely have diverse effects on effect size estimation (cf. Lakens, in press).   
There are several potential solutions to the problem of overestimation of effect sizes. The 
first solution is to only evaluate studies (and replications) with high precision or sample size 
(Stanley, Jarrell, & Doucouliagos, 2010) or, equivalently, high power. As our results showed, 
studies with high power will contain less bias in their effect size (see also Bakker et al., 2012; 
Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2008; Kraemer et al., 1998). A related strategy is not only to 
evaluate, but also to conduct studies and replications with high power (Asendorpf et al., 2013; 
Brandt et al., 2014). Each of the studies with high power has little bias, and combining them will 
increase the precision of the final estimate. A complication with this solution, however, is that the 
power calculations cannot be based on the (previously) published effect size, because that 
published effect size is likely to be overestimated (see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). In order 
to perform an unbiased power calculation, the published effect size needs to be corrected for 
publication bias (Perugini, Galucci, & Constantini, 2014; Van Assen, Van Aert, & Wicherts, 2014; 
Vevea & Hedges, 1995).  
A second solution is to eliminate publication bias altogether: without publication bias there 
is no bias in the effect size estimate. Many researchers have emphasized the importance of 
eliminating publication bias, and there are many proposals with plans of action. For instance, it 
has been proposed to split up the review process: reviewers should base their decision to accept 
or reject an article solely on the introduction and method section to ensure that the decision is 
independent of the outcome (Chambers, 2013; De Groot, 2014; Newcombe, 1987; Smulders, 
2013; Walster & Cleary, 1970). A related method to eliminate publication bias is to evaluate 
submissions on their methodological rigor and not on their results. There are journals that 
evaluate all submissions according to these standards (see for instance PLoS ONE), journals 
with special sections for both “failed and successful” replication attempts (e.g., Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psychological 
Science; Brandt et al., 2014), or websites like Psych File Drawer (http://psychfiledrawer.org) on 
which researchers can upload replication attempts. Furthermore, there have been large scale, 
preregistered replication attempts of different psychological experiments (Klein et al., 2014; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2012; see also Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, Maas, & Kievit, 2012). 
However, even though these proposals and solutions show a high motivation to eliminate 
publication bias, finding and implementing the best strategy will take time. 
What can we do with studies that are already published, and that most likely were subject 
to publication bias? Following upon others (e.g., Banks, Kepes, & Banks, 2012), we recommend 
publication bias analyses on past (as well as future) meta-analytic studies in an attempt to 
evaluate whether publication bias affected the estimated effect size in a field. Many different 
procedures exist that test for signs of publication bias (see e.g., Banks et al., 2012; Rothstein, 
Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). A weakness of statistical procedures that test for publication bias, 
such as the rank correlation test (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994), Egger’s test (Egger, Davey Smith, 
Schneider, & Minder, 1997), the trim and fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b), or 
Ioannidis and Trikalinos’ test for an excess of significant findings (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; for 
an extensive discussion about this test and its usage see e.g., Ioannidis, 2013; Morey, 2013; 
Simonshon, 2013; Vandekerckhove, Guan, & Styrcula, 2013), is that their statistical power is 
usually low for meta-analyses with a typical number of studies. Consequently, when these 
procedures do not signal publication bias, publication bias may still be present and the meta-
analysis’ effect size estimate biased. On the other hand, these tests could also signal publication 
bias whenever there is none (a type I error). When this happens in a multi-study paper, the test 
would falsely imply that the author left out one or more studies, which may have unwarranted 
harmful consequences for the author. 
Another option besides testing for publication bias is estimating an effect size that is 
robust against publication bias or one that is corrected for it. An often used procedure is the trim 
and fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b). However, the trim and fill method does not 
perform well with heterogeneous meta-analyses (Moreno et al., 2009; Terrin, Schmid, Lau, & 
Olkin, 2003) and its performance also depends strongly on assumptions about why studies are 
missing (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). Another procedure that can be used to 
obtain unbiased effect sizes in the presence of publication bias is selection models (Copas, 2013; 
Hedges & Vevea, 1996, 2005; Vevea, Clements, & Hedges, 1993; Vevea & Hedges, 1995; 
Vevea & Woods, 2005). Selection models use the estimated or a priori probability that a study 
with a certain p-value is published, to estimate the influence of publication bias and to calculate 
an adjusted effect size. Selection models can deal with heterogeneous effect sizes (Hedges & 
Vevea, 2005), but may require many studies (e.g., 100 or more) to perform well (Field & Gillett, 
2010). Furthermore, selection models are difficult to implement and depend on sophisticated 
choices and assumptions (Borenstein et al., 2009). A third procedure is to obtain an unbiased 
effect size by using only studies with statistically significant effects (Hedges, 1984; Simonsohn, 
Nelson, & Simmons, 2014; Van Assen, Van Aert, & Wicherts, 2014). Van Assen et al. (2014) 
show that their procedure, called p-uniform, provides unbiased effect size estimates, even with 
the relatively small number of eight studies in a meta-analysis, when the population effect size is 
homogenous. p-uniform also outperformed the standard fixed-effects meta-analysis, the trim and 
fill method, and the test of excess significance, when publication bias was present. Although we 
recognize the merits of all aforementioned procedures for testing and correcting for publication 
bias, they often lack power and/or require rather strong assumptions we believe these procedures 
do not provide the ultimate solution to problems resulting of publication bias. 
Although we cannot establish the exact influence of publication bias on effect sizes 
estimates in published scientific articles, evidence suggests that publication bias affects many 
fields. To solve the problem of overestimated effect sizes, mere replication is not enough. Until 
there are ways to eliminate publication bias or correct for overestimation because of publication 
bias, researchers are wise to only incorporate and perform studies with high power, whether they 
are replications or not. 
  
Footnotes 
1. For more details about the sample and procedure, the original survey, the Dutch translation 
of the survey, and the full data set, see the Open Science Framework page 
https://osf.io/973mb/. 
2. Estimated given a two independent samples comparison, assuming an effect size of d = .50 
(based on estimates from meta-analyses) and a total sample size of 40, the median total 
sample size in psychology (Marszalek et al., 2011). 
3. Based on 697 papers from 10 behavioral journals, assuming a medium effect size of r = .30. 
The authors report the estimated power for a small (r = .1), medium (r = .30), or large (r = .50) 
effect size. We report the power based on r = .30, because it is closest to the average 
estimated effect size in ecological or evolutionary studies of r = .18-.19 (based on 44 meta-
analyses, Jennions & Moller, 2002). The average power we report here is therefore likely to 
be an optimistic estimate. 
4. Based on data from 49 meta-analyses, using the estimated effect sizes in the meta-analyses 
as true effect sizes. 
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Appendix 1: The survey including introduction text 
The aim of this research is to examine how researchers value exact replications. 
More precisely, using five questions we assess your evaluation of the effect of exact 
replication on the accuracy of the estimation of a population effect. Accuracy is 
the closeness of the estimate to the population effect, and is inversely related to the 
bias of an estimate. 
Introduction to questions: please read carefully 
Imagine yourself being in the following situation. You want to estimate the effect of a 
treatment. To estimate this effect, you carry out a literature search. You only include 
articles published in scientific journals in your search. Additionally, you only 
include exact replications in your search. That is, the population, designs and 
procedures of the included studies are identical; the only difference between the 
exact replications may be their sample size. After your search you use the available 
empirical evidence to estimate the treatment effect in the population. 
 In the questions below you are asked to compare two situations. Your task in 





estimate of the effect of the treatment in the population?’. In both situations the 
same treatment effect is estimated. Hence, the question can also be formulated as 
‘Which situation would you prefer when your goal is to obtain an accurate 
estimate of the effect of the treatment in the population?’. 
A situation either involves one published scientific article (that is, no exact 
replications were found) or two published scientific articles. A published article is 
based on either 40 (Small sample size) or 70 (Large) observations. In the five 
questions below each situation is summarized by one or two letters. For instance, ‘L’ 
indicates that only one article was found with a sample size of 70. And ‘L+S’ indicates 
two studies were found that were exact replications of each other, one with 70 and 
the other with 40 observations.  
Instruction for answering the questions 
The table below contains both situations A and B of the questions (first columns) and 
the answers to the questions (last three columns). Answer the question by crossing 
precisely one of the three answering categories. For instance, consider Question 0 in 
the first row. Question 0 compares situation A and situation B, both with a small 
sample of 40 participants. The cross in the last column indicates that the respondent 
believes that both situations yield an equally accurate estimate of the effect of the 





Which situation (A or B) yields the most accurate estimate of the effect of the 
treatment in the population? 
 Question Answer 






Situation A and B 
equally 
accurate 
Question 0 S S   X 
Question 1 L S    
Question 2 L L+S    
Question 3 L S+S    
Question 4 L L+L    
Question 5 L+S S+S    
S = Small study with 40 observations; L = Large study with 70 observations 
 
Thank you for your participation. Any questions or remarks about this research can 











Appendix 2: Calculation of the Effect of Publication Bias and True Effect Size on the 
Accuracy on Effect Size Estimate When Using a z-test 
The following equations show the influence of the proportion of non-significant results published 
(pub) on the accuracy of the effect size estimate in a single study, using a z-test comparing the 
means of two independent samples, with σ = 1 (see also Figure 1 for a schematic representation 
of these equations): 
1) What is the critical value cv of the test? 
 
𝑐𝑣 = 1.645 ∙  √2 𝑁,⁄  
where N is the number of observations per group. 
 
2) What is the z-value z1 of the critical value under the alternative hypothesis? 
 
𝑧1 = (𝑐𝑣 − 𝑑) ∙  √𝑁 2⁄ , 
where d is the standardized true mean difference between the groups. The probability 
that Z>z1 is the power of the test, 1-β. 
 




(1 − 𝛽) ∙  √𝑁 2⁄
+ 𝑑, 
 
where f(z1) is the density of the standardized normal distribution at z1. The formula is 
based on the fact that the expected value of a truncated standardized normal distribution, 
truncated at probability p, equals f(zp)/(1-p). 
 






𝐷0 = 𝑑 −
𝑓(𝑧1)
𝛽 ∙  √𝑁 2⁄
 
 
Note that βD0 + (1-β)D1 = d, as it should. 
 
5) What is the expected value D of the estimate of d? 
 
𝐷 =
𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝛽𝐷0 + (1 − 𝛽)𝐷1
𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝛽 + (1 − 𝛽)
 
The derivations of our results using a t-test comparing the means of two independent samples 






Appendix 3: Estimation of the Amount of Publication Bias in the Literature 
We can make a rough estimate of the amount of publication bias in the literature based on the 
number of significant findings in the literature. We used the following equations (Van Assen, Van 











(1 − β)P(H1) + α P(H0)
𝑝𝑢𝑏[β P(H1) + (1 − α)P(H0)] + (1 − β)P(H1) + α P(H0)
, 
 
where P("H1") and P("H0") are the proportion of significant and non-significant findings in the 
literature respectively, P(H1) and P(H0) are the proportion of effects that are truly non-null or null, 
respectively, α represents type I error,  represents type II error (and (1-) represents power). 
Furthermore, pub < 1 represents the relative proportion of non-significant findings that are 
published, i.e. proportions of significant and insignificant findings that get published are assumed 
to be q and × q, respectively. 
Following Ioannidis (2005), we assume that P(H1) is .50, which is perhaps an optimistic 
assumption, considering the exploratory nature of much psychological research. Furthermore, 
assume a power of .50 and α = .05. If we insert these values into the equation, and we assume 
that pub is .05, we get the following: 
 
P("H1"|published) =
. 5 ∗ .5 + .05 ∗ .5
. 05[. 5 ∗ .5 + (1 − .05). 5] + .5 ∗ .5 + .05 ∗ .5
= .88. 
 
This result is in line with the research of Fanelli (2010) who found that between 84% and 91.5% 
of the papers in social and behavioral sciences report positive results. This would mean that the 
proportion of non-significant findings published lies around .05. 
 Of course this estimate of the amount of publication bias depends heavily on our 





but as high as .50. Simmons et al. (2011) indeed report that the actual α may increase from .05 
to .5 when researchers employ several questionable research practices (QRP). When redoing our 
analysis with α = .5, with assuming these QRP will also boost power from .5 to .9, we obtain 88% 
reported positive results for pub = .32. To conclude, even when assuming scientists heavily use 





Appendix 4: Calculation of Relative Bias in Effect Size Estimate 
We can calculate the relative bias in effect size estimate compared to the situation where only 
significant results are published. Subtracting d from 𝐷 =
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝛽𝐷0+(1−𝛽)𝐷1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝛽+(1−𝛽)
 yields the bias. Denote the 
bias for pub = 0, which equals  𝐷1 –  𝑑, by q. Note that 𝐷0 –  𝑑 = −
1−𝛽
𝛽
 q, since d is the weighted 
average of D0 and D1, with type II error and power as weights, respectively.  
















 denotes relative bias. This formula for relative bias also holds for the t-test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
